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ADAPT: The Wrong Way to Stop
a Clinical Trial
Steven E. Nissen
In an accompanying article published
in PLoS Clinical Trials, the Alzheimer’s
Disease Anti-Inﬂammatory Prevention
Trial (ADAPT) Research Group report
the cardiovascular outcomes from their
study [1]. The circumstances surround-
ing the termination of ADAPT were
unusual and provide an important
lesson for all clinical trialists, demon-
strating the importance of following
rigorous procedures for prematurely
stopping clinical trials. In this case,
stopping the trial before its intended
completion resulted in data that can-
not be reliably interpreted.
On September 30, 2004, Merck with-
drew rofecoxib (Vioxx) from the market
after the trial’s data safety and monitor-
ing board (DSMB) recommended termi-
nation of a placebo-controlled study of
this agent in the prevention of colon
polyps [2]. The reason for study termi-
nation was a statistically signiﬁcant in-
crease in adverse cardiovascular
outcomes. On December 17, 2004, Pﬁzer
announced that termination of a trial of
celecoxib (Celebrex) in colon polyp pre-
vention, because it also showed statisti-
cally signiﬁcant evidence for increased
cardiovascular event rates [3]. The results
of these two trials were subsequently
published in February 2005 in the New
England Journal of Medicine [4,5]. The
revelations about increased cardiovascu-
lar events with these ‘‘coxibs’’ generated
enormous public attention and concern.
However, in both cases, the decision-
making leading to trial discontinuation
was handled appropriately through the
regular reviews conducted by an inde-
pendent DSMB.
Three days following the announcement
of the termination of the celecoxib colon
polyp prevention study, the National
Institute of Health (NIH), issued a press
release entitled ‘‘Use of Non-Steroid
Anti-Inﬂammatory Drugs Suspended in
L a r g eA l z h e i m e r ’ sD i s e a s eP r e v e n t i o n
Trial’’ [6]. The NIH press release stated
that ‘‘data from the ADAPT trial indi-
cated an apparent increase in cardiovas-
cular and cerebrovascular events among
participants taking naproxen when com-
pared to placebo.’’ In the press release,
NIH Director Dr. Elias Zerhouni stated
that ‘‘this step is being taken as a precau-
tionary measure to ensure the safety of
the study’s participants’’ and that ‘‘the
investigators made their decision based
on the risk/beneﬁt analysis speciﬁc to this
trial.’’ Shortly following the NIH an-
nouncement, the Food and Drug Admin-
istration (FDA) issued a public statement
that ‘‘based on emerging information
from a long-term prevention trial, the
risk of cardiovascular and cerebrovascu-
lar events may increase among patients
taking naproxen’’ [7].
These announcements generated
front-page headlines such as ‘‘Heart Risk
Seen in Naproxen’’ (Wall Street Journal),
‘‘Tough Choice: Pain or Risk’’ (USA To-
day), and ‘‘Patients, Doctors Agonize over
Risks of Painkiller (Los Angeles Times) [8].
Occurring immediately following the rev-
elations about rofecoxib and celecoxib,
the naproxen announcement generated
considerable public apprehension [8].
Physicians received many urgent calls
from worried patients. However, there
was a major problem with the naproxen
warning: it was not based upon the
application of standard procedures for
stopping an ongoing clinical trial. During
the subsequent FDA hearings to set policy
on nonsteroidal anti-inﬂammatory agents
(NSAIDs) and COX-2 inhibitors, I de-
scribed the warnings about naproxen as
‘‘the medical equivalent of yelling ‘ﬁre’ in
a crowded auditorium’’ [9].
The Data Finally Become
Available
Now, nearly two years after the closure of
the ADAPT study, we ﬁnally get to see the
data that resulted in the public warning
about naproxen [1]. For the standard
composite endpoint of cardiovascular
death, myocardial infarction, and stroke,
there were 17 events in celecoxib treat-
ment group, 23 in the naproxen arm, and
22 in the placebo. The hazard ratio for
naproxen compared with placebo was
1.57 with 95% conﬁdence intervals of
0.87 to 2.81, p ¼ 0.13. A broader compo-
site outcome that added heart failure and
transient ischemic attack yielded a mar-
ginally signiﬁcant p value when compar-
ing naproxen with placebo.
We must ask whether a DSMB would
stop an ongoing clinical trial for such
ﬁndings. The answer, it appears, was that
the DSMB did not stop the trial; NIH
ofﬁcials did [8]. There was no regularly
scheduled DSMB safety review that re-
sulted in study termination. It appears
that NIH ofﬁcials, concerned about rev-
elations regarding the safety of coxibs in
the colon polyps studies, simply decided
to look at the cardiovascular event results
in ADAPT [8,10]). Seeing a marginally
signiﬁcant difference between naproxen
and placebo, they abruptly stopped the
trial. Indeed, NIH ofﬁcials went even
further and issued the public warning [6].
Both the termination of this trial and
the issuance of a public warning about
naproxen were inappropriate and re-
ﬂected faulty logic. These actions un-
necessarily created public consternation
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PLoS CLINICAL TRIALSand denied the participants in the trial
the opportunity for their commitment to
result in any beneﬁt to themselves or
society [11].
Reinforcing Rigorous Methods
for Safety Monitoring of
Ongoing Trials
Current NIH policies may have contrib-
uted to the decision to prematurely
terminate ADAPT. Surprisingly, NIH
rules allow the leadership of various
scientiﬁc divisions to have unblinded
access to data. Even more surprisingly,
principal investigators are also often
unblinded. This policy provides for con-
siderable temptation to interfere with
trial management. It is well recognized
that during the conduct of randomized
trials that hazard ratios are often unsta-
ble, sometimes drifting over time into
marginal levels of ‘‘signiﬁcance.’’ This is
an artifact of statistics. If you repeatedly
sample data, the multiplicity of ‘‘looks’’ at
the data ensure that there will occasion-
ally appear a transient ‘‘signal’’ of beneﬁt
or harm. These ‘‘signals’’ are not reliable.
We have many sources of evidence that
refute the notion that naproxen increases
the risk of adverse cardiovascular out-
comes. A recent meta-analysis by McGet-
tigan and Henry [12] examined the
relative cardiovascular risks for 23 studies
of NSAIDs and COX-2 inhibitors. The
relative risk for naproxen was 0.97 with
95% conﬁdence intervals ranging from
0.87 to 1.07. The FDA Advisory Panel
meeting in February 2005 opined that
naproxen was the most appropriate com-
parator with which to evaluate the rela-
tive risks of new anti-inﬂammatory agents
[9].
To avoid inappropriate premature ter-
mination of trials, statisticians and clinical
trialists long ago adopted rigorous ‘‘stop-
ping rules’’ for safety monitoring of on-
going trials [13–17]. These rules require a
much higher level of signiﬁcance for harm
or beneﬁt earlier in the trial. The most
common approach, originally described by
O’Brien and Fleming [13], would have
precluded early stopping of ADAPT and
avoided the generation of spurious ﬁnd-
ings. Strict investigator discipline and
appropriate prespeciﬁcation of stopping
rules are required to enforce this type of
rigorous approach.
Who shares responsibility for the im-
proper termination of ADAPT? In my
opinion, a major factor was the inappro-
priate unblinding of the trial by leader-
ship at the NIH. Allowing unrestricted
access to the study data by NIH ofﬁcials
represents an unwise policy and can only
lead to errors of this kind.
The circumstances
surrounding the
termination of ADAPT
demonstrate the
importance of following
rigorous procedures for
prematurely stopping
clinical trials.
Futhermore, the principal investigator
and the Steering Committee should
have, when approached by NIH ofﬁcials
about premature examination of the
trial data, said ‘‘no.’’ Similarly, the
DSMB should have resisted efforts to
improperly interrupt an ongoing trial.
If rebuffed by NIH ofﬁcials, both the
Steering Committee and the DSMB
should have publicly disavowed the
decision to terminate the trial or,
alternatively, explained that the rea-
sons for termination did not include
the ﬁnding of a hazard for naproxen
treatment.
Management of clinical trials is a major
public responsibility. It takes self-disci-
pline and a precise understanding of
statistical methods. For ADAPT, accepted
scientiﬁc procedures were not followed,
resulting in an inappropriate public
warning. Accordingly, the trial results
cannot be reliably interpreted. “
REFERENCES
1. ADAPT Research Group (2006) Cardiovascular
and cerebrovascular events in the randomized,
controlled Alzheimer’s Disease Anti-
inﬂammatory Prevention Trial (ADAPT) PLoS
Clin Trials 1: e33. doi:10.1371/journal.pctr.
0010033
2. Merck Press Ofﬁce (2004) Merck announces
voluntary worldwide withdrawal of VIOXX.
Available: http://www.vioxx.com/vioxx/
documents/english/vioxx_press_release.pdf#
search¼%22Merck%20withdrawal%
20Vioxx%22. Accessed 19 October 2006.
3. Pﬁzer Press Ofﬁce (2004) Pﬁzer statement on
new information regarding cardiovascular
safety of Celebrex. Available: http://www.pﬁzer.
com/pﬁzer/are/investors_releases/2004pr/
mn_2004_1217.jsp. Accessed 19 October
2006.
4. Solomon SD, McMurray JJ, Pfeffer MA, Wittes
J, Fowler R, et al. (2005) Cardiovascular risk
associated with celecoxib in a clinical trial for
colorectal adenoma prevention. N Engl J Med
352: 1071–1080.
5. Bresalier RS, Sandler RS, Quan H, Bolognese
JA, Oxenius B, et al. (2005) Cardiovascular
events associated with rofecoxib in a colorectal
adenoma chemoprevention trial N Engl J Med
352: 1092–1102 [Erratum: N Engl J Med 355:
221.]
6. NIH Ofﬁce of Communications (2004) Use of
non-steroidal anti-inﬂammatory drugs
suspended in large Alzheimer’s disease
prevention trial. Available: http://www.nih.gov/
news/pr/dec2004/od-20.htm. Accessed 19
October 2006.
7. United States Food and Drug Administration
(2004) FDA statement on naproxen. Available:
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/news/2004/
NEW01148.html. Accessed 19 October 2006.
8. Woloshin S, Schwartz LM, Welch HG (2005
February 1) Where the naproxen story went
wrong. Washington Post; page HE01. Available:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/
A52625-2005Jan31?language¼printer.
Accessed 19 October 2006.
9. Department of Health and Human Services,
Food and Drug Administration, Center for
Drug Evaluation and Research (2005) Joint
meeting of the Arthritis Advisory Committeee
and the Drug Safety and Risk Management
Advisory Committee, Volume III. Available:
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/05/
transcripts/2005–4090T3.htm. Accessed 19
October 2006.
10. Herper M (2005 February 18) The naproxen
risk that wasn’t. Forbes Available: http://www.
forbes.com/sciencesandmedicine/2005/02/18/
cx_mh_0218naproxen.html. Accessed 19
October 2006.
11. Zwillich T (2005) Naproxen warning
unjustiﬁed, say FDA experts: Report linking
Aleve to heart attacks unnecessarily scared
public. Available: http://www.medicinenet.com/
script/main/art.asp?articlekey¼43623. Accessed
19 October 2006.
12. McGettigan P, Henry D (2006) Cardiovascular
risk and inhibition of cyclooxygenase: A
systematic review of the observational studies
of selective and nonselective inhibitors of
cyclooxygenase 2. JAMA 296: 1633–1644.
13. O’Brien PC, Fleming TR (1979) A multiple
testing procedure for clinical trials. Biometrics
35: 549–556.
14. Pocock SJ (1982) Interim analyses for
randomized clinical trials: The group
sequential approach. Biometrics 38: 153–162.
15. Goldman AI (1987) Issues in designing
sequential stopping rules for monitoring side
effects in clinical trials. Control Clin Trials 8:
327–337.
16. Emerson SS (1995) Stopping a clinical trial
very early based on unplanned interim
analyses: A group sequential approach.
Biometrics 51: 1152–1162.
17. Geller NL, Pocock SJ (1987) Interim analyses in
randomized clinical trials: Ramiﬁcations and
guidelines for practitioners. Biometrics 43:
213–223.
www.plosclinicaltrials.org November | 2006 | e35 0002